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Speaker: Miriam Barnum Why do states pursue chemical and biological weapons (CBW), despite their limited strategic utility and their prohibition (during some time periods) under international law? Utilizing original quantitative data, I find that internal threats to a state’s governing regime, while of- ten neglected in theories of arming and weapons proliferation, play a significant role in driving states’ choices to pursue chemical and biological weapons. Regimes may pursue CBW in response to two types of domestic threats: coup risk, and the risk of domestic rebellion or civil conflict. In particular, I find that governing regimes facing increases in the risk of a coup may be more likely to initiate chemical and biological weapons programs, and that regimes experiencing domestic unrest may be more likely to begin pursuing chemical weapons. I also examine evidence for external security pathways motivating weapons pursuit, and find that proliferators treat biological weapons more like other ‘strategic weapons’ than they do chemical weapons. These findings have important implications for counterproliferation policy, deterrence, and our theoretical understanding of arming and arms racing.