Professor Charles Calomiris - Too Big to Fail, Deposit Insurance, and Stablecoins скачать в хорошем качестве

Professor Charles Calomiris - Too Big to Fail, Deposit Insurance, and Stablecoins

Why do banks keep taking on hidden risks—and why do regulators keep missing the warning signs until it’s too late? What actually went wrong in the U.S. banking system during the recent wave of stress, and why are “fixes” so often more complicated than effective? In this conversation, economist Charles Calomiris lays out a clear framework for understanding bank risk, supervision, and the political incentives that block real reform. We explore: • How deposit insurance changes bank incentives by removing market discipline • What effective supervision should look like (and where it failed with Silicon Valley Bank) • Why “too big to fail” keeps surviving—despite reform promises • The case for simpler, incentive-based rules (like high cash reserves and market-triggered discipline) • Why good ideas often sit on the shelf until a crisis creates a “window of opportunity” • Commercial real estate exposure and why it matters for banks • Fiscal cliffs, debt, and the intergenerational stakes of policy choices • Stablecoins vs. Bitcoin—and how payments might evolve • Why he connects “truth and beauty” across both research and music About Charles Calomiris: Charles Calomiris is an economist who studied at Yale (BA) and Stanford (PhD), has worked as a professor at Columbia Business School, and served as chief economist at the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. He coauthored Fragile by Design (with Steve Haber), and he also composes and releases classical music. If you enjoyed this episode, subscribe for more deep conversations with the world’s most interesting thinkers. Find more on www.6degrees.blog