First Strike Advantages and Preemptive War | Bargaining and War скачать в хорошем качестве

First Strike Advantages and Preemptive War | Bargaining and War

This lecture explores how first strike advantages can cause a commitment problem that leads to war. We begin by defining those first strike advantages, which we model as an increase to one side's probability of victory and a decrease to the other side's. We can then construct a 2x2 game to see when settlements exist that convince neither side to exploit its first strike advantage. The central result is that if the first strike advantages exceed the cost of war, then the preemption incentive dominates the inefficiency incentive. As a result, war occurs. This is our first rationalist explanation for war. 0:00 Motivating First Strike Advantages 1:12 Constructing the Game 4:18 Can We Sustain Bargaining? 5:15 The Peace Constraints 6:27 When Do Mutually Acceptable Settlements Exist? 7:42 Visualizing the Problem 8:15 The War Condition