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How do firms refashion managerial incentives in response to regulatory actions that curb litigation risk and decrease external discipline? We use staggered passage of Universal Demand (UD) laws, that insulate managers from derivative litigations, as a natural experiment. Firms respond to UD-laws by increasing risk-taking incentives. These incentives, presumably sub-optimal prior to UD-laws, appear to compensate for weaker external discipline and promote valuable risky investments. Effects are stronger in presence of institutional investors but weaker in high-competition industries. Firms increasing risk-taking incentives experience stronger improvements in innovation and/or ROA. We take steps to mitigate endogeneity, identification, and other econometric concerns. Timestamps: 0:00 Introduction 4:16 Motivation and background 10:18 Hypotheses 13:55 Data 16:05 Empirical Approach 18:08 Results 28:05 Conclusion My valuation book: [US]: https://amzn.to/2LUwYQW [Australia] https://amzn.to/2WWX6Ra Courses: International Finance: https://financialanalysis.teachable.c... Valuation: https://bit.ly/36nFfGp Options, Futures, and Derivatives: https://financialanalysis.teachable.c... **************************** *MY GEAR **************************** Logitech c922: https://amzn.to/2xDUfTs Softlight setup available here from Amazon: https://amzn.to/2xHVEbF Wacom writing tablet: https://amzn.to/2YHmyeK