LFRS - Analysing the Organisation of the Bank of England: Limits and Perspective скачать в хорошем качестве

LFRS - Analysing the Organisation of the Bank of England: Limits and Perspective

The London Financial Regulation Seminar is an inter-collegiate and inter-disciplinary group of experts led by CCLS and our Institute of Banking and Finance under the leadership of Professor Rosa M. Lastra and Dr. Daniele D’Alvia. On Monday 17 April 2023, Professor William A. Allen discussed his last research paper titled “Models of Central Banking and the Organisation of the Bank of England” (National Institute of Economic and Social Research). Professor Lastra chaired the event, and Prof. Charles Goodhart was the discussant. Professor William A. Allen is a visitor at the National Institute for Economic and Social Research. He worked at the Bank of England from 1972 – 2004. He was a specialist adviser to the British House of Commons Treasury Committee from 2010 – 2017 and gave evidence to the House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee on quantitative easing in 2021. He has written three books and numerous articles on monetary subjects. Prof. Charles Goodhart is a British economist and Emeritus Professor of Banking and Finance with the Financial Markets group at the London School of Economics, having previously, 1987-2005, been its Deputy Director. Until retirement in 2002, he had been the Normal Sosnow Professor of Banking and Finance at the London School of Economics since 1985. Previously, he had worked at the Bank of England for seventeen years as a monetary adviser, becoming a Chief Adviser in 1980. In 1997 he was appointed one of the outside independent members of the Bank of England’s new Monetary Policy Committee until May 2000. The separation between monetary policy and financial stability which is built into the structure of the Bank of England has become outdated since the global financial crisis. In practice important decisions about financial market operations have been taken by the executive managers of the Bank of England with little input from the Monetary Policy Committee or the Financial Policy Committee, and in some cases without much transparency. In his research paper, Prof. Allen proposes that the Bank of England should in future be managed by a single board, including members recruited outside the Bank’s regular staff, mandated to meet at the Bank’s objectives for both price stability and financial stability, and empowered to decide what operations the Bank should undertake in financial markets. The objectives of the Bank of England would remain unchanged.