Lecture XV - Pavle Stojanović, Can a Skeptic Be Pious and Should He Be скачать в хорошем качестве

Lecture XV - Pavle Stojanović, Can a Skeptic Be Pious and Should He Be

Can a Skeptic Be Pious and Should He Be: Lessons from Ancient Pyrrhonism One of the chief tenets of the Pyrrhonists, the first philosophers to call themselves skeptics, is suspension of belief on everything, including the matters pertaining to religion. This suspension results from the fact that the skeptic finds that mutually exclusive accounts for and against the existence of gods are equally persuasive, in virtue of which he has no reason to prefer either of the two positions. Once suspension is achieved, ideally ataraxia follows, the mental state in which unnecessary disturbances are thoroughly eliminated, making the skeptic perfectly unconcerned and indifferent. Based on this, one would expect the skeptic to be rather disinterested in taking any kind of position towards piety, or at least to be equally disposed both towards affirming as well as denying the existence of gods, and towards engaging in as well as ignoring the religious observances and rituals. Yet surprisingly, this is not what Sextus Empiricus, one of the most prominent Pyrrhonists and our main source on their views, tells us. Instead, he is quite explicit in describing the skeptic as someone who, as a follower of ‘ordinary life’ and ‘laws and customs’ of his community, will say that gods exist and who will engage in religious practice. My aim will be to explore the reasons why a Pyrrhonean skeptic would take such an approach, and to assess whether he can consistently do so. Pavle Stojanović is an Assistant Professor (Docent) of Philosophy at the University of Belgrade. His area of research so far has been in the philosophy of the Hellenistic period, in which he has published several papers. This is part of his broader interest in the questions pertaining to human knowledge and its limits.