[CPP'24] The Last Yard: Foundational End-to-End Verification of High-Speed Cryptography скачать в хорошем качестве

[CPP'24] The Last Yard: Foundational End-to-End Verification of High-Speed Cryptography

[CPP'24] The Last Yard: Foundational End-to-End Verification of High-Speed Cryptography Philipp G. Haselwarter, Benjamin Salling Hvass, Lasse Letager Hansen, Theo Winterhalter, Cătălin Hriţcu, Bas Spitters The Last Yard: Foundational End-to-End Verification of High-Speed Cryptography (Video, CPP 2024) Philipp G. Haselwarter, Benjamin Salling Hvass, Lasse Letager Hansen, Théo Winterhalter, Cătălin Hriţcu, and Bas Spitters (Aarhus University, Denmark; Aarhus University, Denmark; Aarhus University, Denmark; Inria, France; MPI-SP, Germany; Aarhus University, Denmark) Abstract: The field of high-assurance cryptography is quickly maturing, yet a unified foundational framework for end-to-end formal verification of efficient cryptographic implementations is still missing. To address this gap, we use the Coq proof assistant to formally connect three existing tools: (1) the Hacspec emergent cryptographic specification language; (2) the Jasmin language for efficient, high-assurance cryptographic implementations; and (3) the SSProve foundational verification framework for modular cryptographic proofs. We first connect Hacspec with SSProve by devising a new translation from Hacspec specifications to imperative SSProve code. We validate this translation by considering a second, more standard translation from Hacspec to purely functional Coq code and generate a proof of the equivalence between the code produced by the two translations. We further define a translation from Jasmin to SSProve, which allows us to formally reason in SSProve about efficient cryptographic implementations in Jasmin. We prove this translation correct in Coq with respect to Jasmin's operational semantics. Finally, we demonstrate the usefulness of our approach by giving a foundational end-to-end Coq proof of an efficient AES implementation. For this case study, we start from an existing Jasmin implementation of AES that makes use of hardware acceleration and prove that it conforms to a specification of the AES standard written in Hacspec. We use SSProve to formalize the security of the encryption scheme based on the Jasmin implementation of AES. Article: https://doi.org/10.1145/3636501.3636961 ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0198-7751, https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9390-3441, https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3271-3593, https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9881-3696, https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8919-8081, https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2802-0973 Video Tags: high-assurance cryptography, formal verification, computer-aided cryptography, AES, Coq, poplws24cppmain-p4-p, doi:10.1145/3636501.3636961, orcid:0000-0003-0198-7751, orcid:0000-0001-9390-3441, orcid:0000-0003-3271-3593, orcid:0000-0002-9881-3696, orcid:0000-0001-8919-8081, orcid:0000-0002-2802-0973 Presentation at the CPP 2024 conference, January 15-16, 2024, https://popl24.sigplan.org/home/CPP-2024 Sponsored by ACM SIGPLAN, ACM SIGACT, ACM SIGLOG,