The Yalta summit and the II Polish Corps in Italy in the Spring of 1945 скачать в хорошем качестве

The Yalta summit and the II Polish Corps in Italy in the Spring of 1945

With the end of the war in sight, the minds of Allied leaders were turning to the shape of the world after. At the Yalta summit in the Crimea in February, UK Prime Minister Winston Churchill, US President Roosevelt and Soviet leader Stalin agreed that Moscow would annex the territory of eastern Poland that had been occupied in September 1939. Poland was to be compensated with land taken from Germany. Supreme Allied commander in Italy Mark Clark reported the reaction in the Polish Corps in his diary on 3 March. “On 3 March, Clark wrote in his diary The announcement by the Big Three at the Yalta conference with regard to Polish territorial sub-divisions after the war, as delineated by the Curzon Line, created a panic in the Polish Corps, commanded by General Anders, in my 15th Army Group. General Anders has long been an outspoken opponent of this solution and, having been a prisoner of the Russians along with thousands of his men and most of them living east of the Curzon Line, the solution was entirely unacceptable. Anders' first violent reaction was to send a letter to the Commanding General of the Eighth Army requesting that his corps be relieved immediately from front line duty. He even intimated that it would be better to accept the Polish Corps as prisoners of war. He felt that under the circumstances he could not be responsible for holding a sector with mixed emotions as prevailed among his men. (Eighth Army commander Richard) Mccreery talked to him, and I sent for Anders. The gist of my conversation was "What are you going to do about it? If you turn in your suits now you lost the respect of the Allies, your only friends. Your men are going to follow the cue you indicate to them. If you become a defeatist and indicate that all hopes are lost to your men, you will have failed in your duty as their commander. I told Anders that here was an opportunity for him to be a great patriot - forget himself and to require that his men maintain the fighting standards they are known to have. I told him that in my opinion our President Roosevelt would not sit at the conference and willingly turn the new Poland lock , stock and barrel over to the Bolshevists. I told him he was taking the most gloomy attitude possible and that it could not possibly be as bad as heforecast . The only thing for him to do was sit tight, main tain the standard of his men at the highest possible level and await developments. In such a case, the patriotic attitude which he had taken and prevailed upon his men would be brought by me to the attention of President Roosevelt and also to the Prime Minister. Before leaving me he promised that his men would maintain their defensive sector but that he had to go to England to discuss it with his government. The question which worries me is will the Poles be able to take part in an important role in the offensive battle which I am planning. There is some question that they will. I have talked this matter over with all concerned, including Eighth Army Commander and staf, but the real answer will be disclosed when Anders returns for a conference with me. With the withdrawals from 15th Army Group, it would be a serious blow if I could not count on the Poles for all - out offensive action.” This is a channel about the Italian campaign