[eat & LEARN Seminar] Merchant and Regulatory Incentives for Efficient Transmission Investment скачать в хорошем качестве

[eat & LEARN Seminar] Merchant and Regulatory Incentives for Efficient Transmission Investment

Title: Merchant and Regulatory Incentives for Efficient Transmission Investment:Bridging Market Design and Regulation Speaker: Prof. Mohammad Reza Hesamzadeh (KTH Royal Institute of Technology) Efficient expansion of electricity transmission networks is a cornerstone of the energy transition, yet it remains one of the most challenging problems in electricity market design. This seminar explores how merchant and regulatory approaches to transmission investment can be reconciled within a unified economic framework.The talk first reviews the limitations of traditional merchant transmission investment based on congestion rents and Financial Transmission Rights, explaining why such mechanisms generally fail to deliver socially optimal outcomes in meshed AC networks. It then introduces a class of simple, non-Bayesian regulatory incentive mechanisms, with a particular focus on the H-R-G-V mechanism, which aligns the profit-maximizing objectives of a transmission company with social welfare maximization results. Building on recent research, the seminar demonstrates how transmission investment can be decentralized through carefully designed incentive schemes that reward long-term welfare creation, including mechanisms based on generalized hedging instruments and extended Financial Transmission Rights. The seminar concludes by discussing policy implications for transmission planning and investment in electricity systems with high shares of renewable generation. Organized by CALOP (The Center for Algorithm and Optimization) @ POSTECH