Philosophy of Science: Part 1. The Scientific Worldview скачать в хорошем качестве

Philosophy of Science: Part 1. The Scientific Worldview

#philosophy #science #philosophyofscience, #scientificexplanation #introduction #worldpicture A scientific picture of the world, which is true to logical principles, must construct a certain process using a model based on the following basic principles: 1. The process has to be of transitional nature, i.e., it has to have a beginning and an end. 2. The process has to have separate components. 3. The process has to be the result of the sum of external influences on components of the process. The world, thus, is made up of processes of external impact, since everything is explained by means of external phenomena isolated from each other. The fact that individual processes can and should be viewed as internal should not confuse us. It is also possible to explain such an internal phenomenon as, for example, the circulatory system in terms of the external influence of its components, i.e., according to the aforementioned scientific axioms. Regardless of whether a new non-mechanical paradigm has replaced the Newtonian mechanical world, science remains in fact mechanical because it simply does not know another model of explanation. Representatives of the world of science, such as Thomas Kuhn, may argue that science is radically changing, that scientific paradigms replace each other in history, or that, according to Paul Feyerabend's revolutionary thesis, that science does not really have scientific grounds to claim its scientific exceptionalism, but with all this, science in principle has not changed because of its stable metaphysical foundation, which boils down to the fact that everything has its own mechanism, which is not inherent in something or someone as such but simply is the sum of external influence of the constituent elements at a certain time. Positivism and analytical philosophy are seen as a guarantee of fundamental explainability of physical reality in the “demystification of thinking”. What, however, follows from a similar assumption, i.e., when the field of scientific explanation expands to a universal scale (i.e., the totality of all the elements of the world), is that everything that happens is the result of the external influence of the constituent elements. When, as Semon Frank remarked: “Any causal connection is ultimately reduced to a simple stated factual connection: A is associated with B; If we manage to understand the basis of this connection through the discovery of its intermediate links (A is connected with B; because it is connected with C which itself is connected with B), then this understanding ultimately rests on a simple statement: “It is so.” The very connection between one and the other remains incomprehensible and unintelligible. It is for us the expression of something actually given, some kind of structure of the being, which we are forced to humbly accept without any understanding of its inner comprehension or its transparency for our spirit.” So, based on the extrapolation of the scientific explanatory model in full scale, absolutely nothing would happen, and this, or rather the absence of something, would “be” when there would not be any internal power in anything.