开年重磅：张又侠案最新进展｜习近平论功行赏网络空间部队｜ скачать в хорошем качестве

开年重磅：张又侠案最新进展｜习近平论功行赏网络空间部队｜

成为此频道的会员即可获享以下福利：    / @duwen2024   开年重磅：张又侠案最新进展｜习近平论功行赏网络空间部队｜Major News at the Beginning of the Year: The Latest Developments in the Zhang Youxia Case | Xi Jinping Confers Honors upon the Cyberspace Forces According to Merit | 春节假期结束了，作为开年节目，今天的节目虽然篇幅不长，但是非常重磅。张又侠案的最新进展来了，习近平论功行赏｜网络空间部队立功｜中共舆论战的新阶段 为什么是这个选题？因为老杜近日获悉了一个非常重磅的信息：日前，中央军委发布表扬令，表彰了网络安全部队某旅、某团等多个单位，表彰他们在处置张又侠、刘振利案对外网络作战过程中取得重大成功的嘉奖令，据说这个嘉奖令是习近平亲自签发的。多个单位和个人荣立集体和个人一等功和二等功。说实话这个消息，令老杜恍然大悟，也震惊不已，真是细思极恐。所以今天一定要聊一聊这个话题。 关注张又侠、刘振利案的朋友因该会注意到这样一个细节，这个案子非常特殊，可谓一反常态。案件的查处和信息公布全部由军方在主导，中共地方各级党政机关自上而下都三缄其口。从时间线上看，从海外神秘自媒体放风到国防部举办专场记者会高调公布再到解放军报连篇累牍批判，再到国际大牌媒体华尔街日报、纽约时报不断喂料。完全一副超级自信、处处展现舆论主动权的样子。实际上，就是中共运用信息差，通过主动投喂的方式，掌控舆论节奏，逐步将舆论的惊涛骇浪引向平稳过渡的状态。可谓成功将张又侠、刘振利被包装成了变节者、叛国者、政变失败者的傻帽形象，而习近平则被包装成成功的运筹帷幄的铁腕统治者光辉形象。整个事件从国内到国际，从中共内部和解放军内部的巨大冲突和矛盾被在舆论层面一一瓦解，至此千钧一发的是危险时刻，习近平暂时成功稳住了国际社会、稳住了党心、军心、民心，也暂时稳住了他这个风雨飘摇的独裁政权。这种全新打发，这一系列操作都指向了一个中共全新的军种：中国人民解放军网络空间部队。 不瞒各位，在当我向国内朋友了解网络空间部队情况时，国内的朋友直接告诉我，建议我别碰他们。说如果我碰了他们，我可能会面临非常恐怖的网络攻击。这对我并不利。老杜的回答是，我不能怕，也不能退，如果连老杜都怕了、都退了，那还有谁愿意继续与他们面对和厮杀呢？所以我决定坚决制作本期节目。 最新情况显示，近年来，不论是习近平抑或是中央军委，都已经将网络战视为一种正在发生、实际进行的军事冲突。传统媒体正在被抛弃或者习近平始终认为、也一再强调，互联网作战事关共产党政权实际上也就是他本人权力的生死存亡。目前中共全力建设的第一军种不是火箭军、也不是海陆空军，而是网络空间部队。网络空间部队不论人员亦或是装备近年来都呈几何式增长，完全没有上限。因为这支部队已经在国际网络战的战场最前沿。就本次张又侠、刘振力案网络主导权战役而言，据说背后的水非常深，真正是由习近平亲自部署、亲自下达的作战命令。网络空间部队通过海内外联动、提前布局、主动出击，前出作战与后方互动相结合的战法，成功主导、引领和把握了这一重要战役的节奏和力度，即有效打击了对手，也成功维护了军内稳定、维护了习近平主席权威、维护了社会大局稳定。在风波即将过去之际，习近平亲自部署了此轮论功行赏。 这则简短的信息，令老杜不得不深思、不得不复盘本次张又侠、刘振利案，对中共和全世界而言，到底得失几何？中共内部说的“提前布局”“主动出击”“前出作战与后方互动结合”等词汇到底是什么意思？这些都是中共的党八股，非常值得简单解读一下： Those who have followed the Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli cases will likely have noticed a particular detail: this case is highly unusual and can be said to run counter to normal patterns. The investigation and release of information have been entirely led by the military, while CCP local party and government organs at all levels have maintained strict silence from top to bottom. Chronologically speaking, from the initial hints released by mysterious overseas self-media, to the Ministry of National Defense holding a special press conference for high-profile disclosure, to the PLA Daily publishing repeated condemnations, and then to major international media outlets such as The Wall Street Journal and The New York Times continuously being fed information—throughout, there has been an air of supreme confidence and complete command over the initiative in public opinion. In reality, this was the CCP’s use of information asymmetry, seizing control of the rhythm of public discourse through proactive information feeding, gradually guiding the turbulent waves of public opinion toward a state of stable transition. It successfully packaged Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli as turncoats, traitors, and foolish failed coup plotters, while portraying Xi Jinping as a brilliant iron-fisted ruler who strategizes and commands with mastery. The immense conflicts and contradictions within the CCP and the PLA, domestically and internationally, were dissolved one by one at the level of public opinion. At that critical juncture of extreme peril, Xi Jinping temporarily succeeded in stabilizing the international community, stabilizing party morale, military morale, and public sentiment, and for the time being stabilizing his own precarious autocratic regime. This entirely new approach and series of operations all point to a new branch of the CCP military: the People’s Liberation Army Cyberspace Force. To speak candidly, when I inquired with friends within the country about the Cyberspace Force, they directly advised me not to touch upon them. They said that if I did, I might face extremely severe cyberattacks, which would not be to my advantage. Lao Du’s response was that I cannot be afraid, nor can I retreat. If even Lao Du is afraid and retreats, then who would be willing to continue confronting and contending with them? Therefore, I resolved firmly to produce this episode.