Are You Dreaming Your Reality? (Dream Argument) скачать в хорошем качестве

Are You Dreaming Your Reality? (Dream Argument)

Epistemological Skepticism (Plato’s Theaetetus, Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Pyrrhonism, Descartes in Meditations, Chinese Taoist philosopher Chuang Tzu or Zhuang Zhou – Zhuangzi - and the butterfly, Mahayana and Tibetan Buddhist philosophers such as Namkhai Norbu). Applies only to subjective experiences not to rational inquiry like mathematics. We need to try some other way. We have to resort to the structure of reality to attempt a response. Reality is analytic (veritable by virtue of self-reference and self-containment in the Frege-Carnap analyticity sense), a-priori (does not depend on experience, contrary to empiricists, Quine, and Wittgenstein), and falsifiable. Knowing reality involves a single language (Aristotelian metaphysics). Dreams are synthetic (veritable only by virtue of reference to reality), a-posteriori (depend on and refer to experience), and non-falsifiable. Experiencing dreams involves translation between at least two languages (Benjamin’s Edenic language). The concept of Self is dream-like, not reality-like. The Self is a dictionary from reality to dreams and vice versa. Vicarious dreams (Rosen & Sutton 2013) Social simulation (Revonsuo et al. 2015) Selfhood in dreams (Revonsuo 2005, 2006, Metzinger 2003, 2009) Minimal self in dreams and minimal phenomenal selfhood (Windt 2015a, 2018) Self-experience including bodily experience in dreams identical to waking Revonsuo (2005) Layers of waking self-experience missing in nonlucid dreams Metzinger (2003, 2009; see also Windt & Metzinger 2007) Cognitive and bodily self-experience in dreams Windt (2015a) (Koppehele-Gossel et al. 2016) Self-experience can be reduced to pure spatiotemporal-self-location (Windt 2010) Minimal phenomenal selfhood (Blanke & Metzinger 2009; see also Metzinger 2013b) Differential features of reality and dreams (verificationism): special signs (e.g., things impossible under the laws of physics, Hobbes absence of the absurd, Descartes’ coherence test), special features (e.g., sequentiality), waking up and connecting to the rest of our life (Descartes’ coherence test , Malcolm’s coherence argument), being able to tell the difference most of the time (statistical test, Augustine), experiences unique to dreaming (Locke’s pain argument), absence of introspective critical thinking (Grundmann). But, of course, dreams can meet all these tests and resemble wakefulness to the fullest. For example: when we dream that we are waking up or when we mistake the dream for reality (e.g., in PTSD). Concept of dreaming is derived, not from dreaming, but from descriptions of dreams, i.e., from the familiar phenomenon that we call “telling a dream”. (Wittgenstein , Malcolm 1959:55) (Maury, 1861, Gregory, 1916, Daniel Dennett (1976, 1979) cassette theory. Lucid dreaming proves dreams is real imaginative experience (Windt) Personal horizon (J. J. Valberg in his book Dream, Death and the Self, 2007) Lucid dreaming, REM sleep occurs in the brain, and dream enactment disorder as proofs that dreaming is a state of consciousness, experiences. States of consciousness are founded on epistemological knowledge (justified knowing) or on beliefs (unjustified knowing). Similar to hallucinations, illusions, mind wandering, and imaginative experiences. Disputing Malcolm (Putnam 1962 [1986]) (Nagel 1959) The difference between wakefulness and dreams is, therefore, a question of justification: how do we justify our knowledge (that we are awake, not dreaming). The answer is: we cannot. Weak Justification (Chihara & Fodor 1965) applied to dreaming (Ayer 1960) (Siegler 1967; Schröder 1997). Make-believe, not belief (Sosa) Dreams are imagined scenarios, not beliefs about the real world and wakefulness which could also be mere imaginings (Jonathan Ichikawa, Nathan Ballantyne, Ian Evans) Dreaming is phenomenality pure and simple, untouched by external physical stimulation or behavioural activity. (Revonsuo 2006: 75) This is completely untrue (Windt): dreams are in touch with both the environment and with our bodies (proprioception). Generative models and predictive processing: systems that know how to perceive an object as a cat are thus systems that, ipso facto, are able to use a top-down cascade to bring about the kinds of activity pattern that would be characteristic of the presence of a cat. […] Perceivers like us, if this is correct, are inevitably potential dreamers and imaginers too. Moreover, they are beings who, in dreaming and imagining, are deploying many of the very same strategies and resources used in ordinary perception. (Clark 2013a: 764).