Robert Ziegelmann - Towards Analytic Left-Hegelianism скачать в хорошем качестве

Robert Ziegelmann - Towards Analytic Left-Hegelianism

Become a Member of our Channel to access the entire archives of past and present Seminars.    / @newcentre   BECOME A MEMBER: https://thenewcentre.org/membership/m... "Recording from the Marx & Pittsburgh School Conference, organized by The New Centre for Research & Practice & The Centre for Philosophy of Education at the Institute of Education, University College London. ABSTRACT: How to “usher analytic philosophy from its Hegelian to its Marxist phase”? At first glance, Brandom’s Hegel already comes close to Marx’s historical materialism, given that he takes all ‘‘transcendental constitution’’ to be ‘‘social institution” (Brandom 2002, 48; Brandom 2000, 34; original phrase: Haugeland 1982 [cf. Brandom 1999, 184]). In fact, the difference is less about “materialism” vs. “idealism” but rather about the infamous rationality of the actual (cf. Giladi 2021). Methodologically, Marx remains fully Hegelian by affirming that “[r]eason has always existed”. It is by adding that reason does not yet exist “in a reasonable form” (MECW 3, 143) that he departs from Hegel. In order for reason to be fully actualized, the whole normative and institutional framework would have to be transcended. This, I argue, is what fundamentally distinguishes left- from right-wing Hegelianism. How does this systematic notion of left-Hegelianism relate to Brandom’s Hegel? Consider the concept of “determinate negation” which Brandom rightly calls Hegel’s “most fundamental semantic-cum-metaphysical concept” (Brandom 2014, 11; cf. Brandom 2001, 64). According to Brandom, “determinate negation” means “material incompatibility” (Brandom 2021, 14–15): Conceptual norms are essentially commitments whose content is determined through the inferential connections to other concepts (Brandom 2000, 15–16). The ‘inferential articulation’ of conceptual content (Brandom 1994, 622) occurs through a (historical) process of intersubjective negotiation (Brandom 2002, 220). Brandom’s interpretation of determinate negation in terms of inferentialist semantics is certainly helpful, yet there is something puzzling about it. For Hegel, determinate negation does not simply mean “determination of x through exclusion of y”, it crucially also designates a new, higher stage which in some way encompasses both x and y (cf. Sparby 2014, 2–9). First and foremost, “determinate negation” is synonymous with what Hegel calls the “next truth”, i. e. the rational successor that emerges when a given form of life collapses under its internal contradictions. Nevertheless, Brandom is onto something. The “new, true object” (Brandom 2019, ch. 3) is not really new. Hegel merely reconstructs the rationality of what is already actual. “Determinate negation” signifies the next step within a process of philosophical presentation, which is not identical with any real historical development. Brandom emphasizes the open-endedness of those processes through which we discover what we have implicitly committed ourselves to (Brandom 1994, 647). Nevertheless, by identifying determinate negation and material incompatibility, he proves to be, at bottom, a right-wing Hegelian. According to him, all that remains is to make explicit what is already contained in our given forms of life. For left-Hegelians, in contrast, radical conceptual change (cf. Pippin 2007, 157, 167–174) is not merely a thing of the past. To reach its Marxist phase, philosophy not only needs to become social theory. It also needs to incorporate an element of voluntarist partisanship. The rational successor to our current form of life is yet to be determined: “Determinate negation” (bestimmte Negation) needs to become “determining negation” (bestimmende Negation). "