Air Niugini Flight 73 Cockpit Footage скачать в хорошем качестве

Air Niugini Flight 73 Cockpit Footage

Follow us on Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/aircrashdai... Accident Description: https://www.instagram.com/p/CjDVUiyPf... 𝗔𝗶𝗿 𝗡𝗶𝘂𝗴𝗶𝗻𝗶 𝗙𝗹𝗶𝗴𝗵𝘁 𝟳𝟯 was a scheduled international passenger flight from Pohnpei to Port Moresby with an intermediate stop in Chuuk. The flight was being operated by a Boeing 737-800 (Reg. P2-BXE) on 𝗦𝗲𝗽𝘁𝗲𝗺𝗯𝗲𝗿 𝟮𝟴, 𝟮𝟬𝟭𝟴. The plane departed Pohnpei at 22:22 UTC. At 23:08 the co-pilot contacted Chuuk radio. At 23:15 the co-pilot made an inbound broadcast call stating their intention to track for the RNAV (GPS) runway 04, from the east south-east. Five minutes later the co-pilot made a general broadcast, stating that they were established on 041 inbound via the RNAV (GPS) runway 04. The plane was then configured for the approach. At 1,000 feet the plane was stable but above the 3° glidepath. At 23:23 the captain disconnected the auto-pilot and stated: "I’m going back on profile." When passing 548 feet, the plane entered a storm cell and heavy rain and the captain called for the wipers to be switched on. After passing the MDA, between 307 feet fourteen 'Sink Rate' and 'Glideslope' aural alerts began to sound. The pilots disregarded the alerts, and did not acknowledge the "minimums" and 100 feet alerts. After descending through 100 feet the co-pilot noticed they were dangerously low and called rapidly: "Too low! We’re too low! We’re too low! We’re too low!" The plane then skipped across the water several times before it settled in the water and turned clockwise through 210° and drifted 460 feet south east of the runway 04 extended centerline. 𝗖𝗮𝘂𝘀𝗲𝘀 [𝗖𝗼𝗻𝘁𝗿𝗶𝗯𝘂𝘁𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗙𝗮𝗰𝘁𝗼𝗿𝘀]: The flight crew did not comply with Air Niugini Standard Operating Procedures Manual (SOPM) and the approach and pre-landing checklists. The RNAV (GPS) Rwy 04 Approach chart procedure was not adequately briefed. The aircraft’s flight path became unstable with lateral over-controlling commencing shortly after autopilot disconnect at 625 ft (677 ft). From 546 ft (600 ft) the aircraft was flown in Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) and the rate of descent significantly exceeded 1,000 feet/min in Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) from 420 ft (477 ft). The flight crew heard, but disregarded, 13 EGPWS aural alerts (Glideslope and Sink Rate), and flew a 4.5º average flight path (glideslope). The pilots lost situational awareness and their attention was channelised or fixated on completing the landing. The PIC did not execute the missed approach at the MAP despite: PAPI showing 3 whites just before entering IMC; the unstabilised approach; the glideslope indicator on the PFD showing a rapid glideslope deviation from half-dot low to 2-dots high within 9 seconds after passing the MDA; the excessive rate of descent; the EGPWS aural alerts: and the EGPWS visual PULL UP warning on the PFD. The copilot (support/monitoring pilot) was ineffective and was oblivious to the rapidly unfolding unsafe situation. It is likely that a continuous "WHOOP WHOOP PULL UP" hard aural warning, simultaneously with the visual display of PULL UP on the PFD (desirably a flashing visual display PULL UP on the PFD), could have been effective in alerting the crew of the imminent danger, prompting a pull up and execution of a missed approach, that may have prevented the accident.