Phenomenal Conservatism & Induction | With Michael Huemer скачать в хорошем качестве

Phenomenal Conservatism & Induction | With Michael Huemer

How can we know that the next bread that we eat will nourish, rather than kill us? How can we know that the Earth is spherical and not flat? Some skeptic philosophers argued that since such conclusions don’t follow deductively from their premises (e.g. we can claim without committing any deductive contradiction that every bread so far has been nourishing, but the next will kill us), their connection is not “immediate” and thus we can’t know that they are true, nor have any evidence in their favour. I’ve had the pleasure to join Dr. Michael Huemer, a highly prominent epistemologist, to discuss the above-described “problem of induction,” his work related to it – especially his view called “phenomenal conservatism” – as well as to share glimpses of my own research on the issue. As to presenting my views, the claims presented show mere indications of my research and lack proper formulation. ****** You can find me on: Twitter:   / epagogist   Substack: https://inductioninrush.substack.com/ ****** If you would like, you can support the channel via: PayPal: paypal.me/ASynowczyk Patreon:   / membership   ****** Some terminological context: 1. “Phenomenal Conservatism” is a view positing mental states called “seemings” and stating that “If it seems to S that p, then, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has at least some degree of justification for believing that p” (Huemer, 2007, p. 30). The main examples of seemings are perceptual seemings and a priori intuitions, such as those of mathematics. Their character has often been described as having a “feeling of truth.” 2. “The Material Theory of Induction” is a novel theory of induction developed by John D. Norton (2003, 2010, 2014, 2021, & 2024), on which it is specific “facts”, not general rules, that ground inductive inference directly, without any mediation of the latter (2021, p. 46). Most have assumed, along with the skeptic, that there is a gap between the premises and the conclusion of an inductive argument that needs to be mediated by some rule(s) (Norton, 2021, pp. 21-22). The material strategy starts by questioning and rejecting that assumption, claiming that the connection is in fact immediate (Norton, 2021, p. 46). ****** Some relevant sources: Huemer M. (2007). Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 74(1), 30–55. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2... Huemer, M. (2013). Phenomenal Conservatism Über Alles. In Ch. Tucker (Ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism (pp. 328-350). Oxford University Press. McCain, C., & Moretti, L. (2024). Phenomenal Explanationism and the Look of Things. In K. McCain,S. Stapleford, & M. Steup (Eds.), Seemings: New Arguments, New Angles (pp. 217-233). Routledge. McCain, K., Stapleford, S., & Steup, M. (2024). Introductory Note. In K. McCain,S. Stapleford, & M. Steup (Eds.), Seemings: New Arguments, New Angles (pp. 1-5). Routledge. Norton, J. D. (2003). A Material Theory of Induction. Philosophy of Science, 70(4), 647–670. https://doi.org/10.1086/378858 Norton, J. D. (2005). A Little Survey of Induction. In P. Achinstein (Ed.), Scientific Evidence: Philosophical Theories and Applications (pp. 9–34). The Johns Hopkins University Press. Norton, J. D. (2005). A Little Survey of Induction. In P. Achinstein (Ed.), Scientific Evidence: Philosophical Theories and Applications (pp. 9–34). The Johns Hopkins University Press. Norton, J. D. (2010). There Are No Universal Rules for Induction. Philosophy of Science, 77(5), 765–777. https://doi.org/10.1086/656542 Norton, J. D. (2014). A Material Dissolution of the Problem of Induction. Synthese, 191, 671–90. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-013-03... Norton, J. D. (2021). The Material Theory of Induction. University of Calgary Press. Norton, J. D. (2024). The Large-Scale Structure of Inductive Inference. University of Calgary Press. Tucker, Ch. (2013). Seemings and Justification: An Introduction. In Ch. Tucker (Ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism (pp. 1-32). Oxford University Press. Winkler, K. (2016). Hume’s Skeptical Logic of Induction. In P. Russell (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Hume (pp. 191-227). Oxford University Press. ****** Intro source: https://stock.adobe.com/video/old-big...