Protect the Permanent Fund, or Protect the Spend? скачать в хорошем качестве

Protect the Permanent Fund, or Protect the Spend?

In this episode of oversightLIVE, Ben Carpenter breaks down the Senate Finance presentation by Callan, the Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation’s paid consultant, on long-term investment strategy and the proposed restructuring of the Fund. The headline issue isn’t market performance. It’s governance and control. Callan presented modeling showing roughly a 47% probability of meeting the Corporation’s target of CPI + 5% (Consumer Price Index plus five percent). In plain terms, more than half the time the Fund is projected to miss its long-term earnings target. At the same time, legislators are advancing a constitutional proposal to: Roll the ERA (Earnings Reserve Account) into the corpus (principal), and Lock in a 5% POMV (Percent of Market Value) annual draw. Here’s the structural problem: If the Fund earns less than CPI + 5% in a given year but government still draws 5%, the difference comes from principal. Over time, repeated shortfalls reduce the Fund’s earning capacity. That’s not theory — it’s arithmetic. The current structure prevents spending from the corpus. The proposed structure protects the draw. This debate is being framed as “protecting the Fund.” But the mechanics suggest the priority is protecting government spending — ensuring a predictable 5% revenue stream regardless of performance. Key takeaways: The Permanent Fund has underperformed the median of selected peer funds over a 20-year window. Asset allocation decisions are made by a board appointed solely by the governor (legislation has been introduced to require legislative confirmation of public members). Diversification is legally required, and concentration in something like the S&P 500 may not meet federal fiduciary standards. Inflation proofing only requires additional deposits if earnings fail to exceed inflation. If returns meet CPI + 5% and only 5% is drawn, inflation is already covered. Rolling the ERA into the corpus removes the fiscal “speed bump” that currently limits overspending in bad years. The broader concern: When government relies primarily on investment earnings rather than a growing private economy, incentives shift. Revenue stability becomes detached from economic productivity. Over time, that alters both fiscal discipline and political behavior. The core question isn’t whether we want strong returns. It’s whether we are designing a system to preserve capital for future generations — or to guarantee spending today.