AGU Chapman Conference -- Climate Science: M. Bryson Brown скачать в хорошем качестве

AGU Chapman Conference -- Climate Science: M. Bryson Brown

AGU Chapman Conference on Communicating Climate Science: A Historic Look to the Future 08 June 2013 — 13 June 2013, Granby, CO, USA Presenter: M. Bryson Brown Monday, June 10, 2013, 8:15 a.m. - 8:30 a.m. Session: Better Climate Communication Abstract Title: On the Differential Diagnosis of Denial and Skepticism Public discussion of a number of scientific issues has been characterized by an interesting social phenomenon widely labelled 'denialism'. Denialists characteristically reject a broad scholarly consensus in some area of study—three current examples are the benefits of vaccination and the low level of risk associated with vaccinations; the fact of evolution and the central role of natural selection in explaining adaptation, and the impact of greenhouse gas emissions on the earth's climate. Philosophers are all too aware that it's easy to challenge assertions, even when they are well-grounded by common sense and/or scientific standards. Skeptical reasoning has been explored by philosophers for thousands of years, in multiple cultures and traditions. The possibility of skeptical reasoning arises naturally from reflection on how we go about justifying assertions: When an assertion is challenged, attempts to justify it standardly take the form of making further claims from which the assertion can be inferred. Obviously enough, the further claims can be challenged in their turn, as can the inference from them to the initial assertion. Given this pattern, simple regress arguments for strong forms of skepticism are available: one can argue that no claim is ever justified, since every justification offered can be questioned by challenging a premise or by challenging the inference that makes the premises support the conclusion, and it seems that no challenger is ever obliged to give up her challenges. Alternatively, simply inverting W.V.O. Quine's dictum that any claim can be defended 'come what may' by making adjustments elsewhere in the 'web of belief' suggests that one can persist in denying any claim one feels a need to reject by the same expedient. Superficially, the resulting situation is symmetrical: each side presents its evidence and arguments while rejecting those on the other side. The focus of the response we present here is on the question of how to distinguish healthy from unhealthy forms of skepticism. Further, what we're looking for should not be terribly subtle or philosophically intricate. For instance, it's not hard to recognize the irrationality of evolution denial: familiarize yourself with the literature, follow the give-and-take, consider the evidence offered and arguments made on each side, and examine the history of the debate over evolution since the publication of Origin, and the irrationality of the deniers, from the empty shell of intelligent design's natural theology to the unexamined literalism of fundamentalists, is obvious. Denialists have gone seriously wrong, and we should be able to say something straightforward about how. We argue that denialism is not a matter of holding different views about what's true, what the evidence supports or doesn't support, which sources are to be trusted and which are not, and so forth. While denialist views can be rationalized by carrying out a systematic reconstruction of commitments about these matters, they don't originate in such differences, and the differences (and ongoing adjustments) that are required for such a rationalization don't stand up to examination. A serious, epistemically engaged skeptic about climate change will be much more skeptical about climate change denial. For more information, please visit: http://chapman.agu.org/climatescience/