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In this video, we discuss the case of Bentkowski v. City of New York, which addresses whether NYC is subject to a claim of promissory estoppel for changing retiree-healthcare programs after decades of different choices. A must watch for all new york city administrators, healthcare professionals, municipal attorneys, labor lawyers, public union officials, appellate attorneys, law students, legislators, court watchers, and all who are interested in real civil cases. Case Name: Matter of Bentkowski v. City of New York Citation: 2025 NY Slip Op 03690 (https://law.justia.com/cases/new-york...) Publication Date: 06/18/25 Oral Argument Link: • No. 57 Matter of Bentkowski v City of New ... Issue: Is NYC is subject to a claim of promissory estoppel for changing retiree-healthcare programs after decades of different choices? Key Parts of the Decision: Overall Issue: “The primary issue before us is whether petitioners are entitled to judgment on their promissory estoppel cause of action.” Overall Holding: “Because we conclude that petitioners are not so entitled, and that their alternative grounds for relief raised before us lack merit, we reverse the order of the Appellate Division and remit the matter to Supreme Court for a determination on petitioners' remaining causes of action.” “The doctrine of promissory estoppel, which was conceived in 1920 and has developed over the past century, "provides a remedy for many promises or agreements that fail the test of enforceability under many traditional contract doctrines" (Calamari & Perillo, Contracts § 6.1, at 218 [6th ed]; see Restatement [Second] of Contracts § 90). While we have never recognized promissory estoppel as a standalone cause of action (see Matter of Hennel, 29 NY3d 487, 494 n 3 [2017]; Allegheny Coll. v National Chautauqua County Bank of Jamestown, 246 NY 369, 373-374 [1927]), the Appellate Division has done so in at least some circumstances, and its departments are unanimous that an essential element of a promissory estoppel claim is a " 'clear and unambiguous promise' " (Villnave Constr. Servs., Inc. v Crossgates Mall Gen. Co. Newco, LLC, 201 AD3d 1183, 1186 [3d Dept 2022]; see Vassenelli v City of Syracuse, 138 AD3d 1471, 1475 [4th Dept 2016]; Sabre Intl. Sec., Ltd. v Vulcan Capital Mgt., Inc., 95 AD3d 434, 439 [1st Dept 2012]; Agress v Clarkstown Cent. School Dist., 69 AD3d 769, 771 [2d Dept 2010]; see also 57 NY Jur 2d, Estoppel, Ratification, and Waiver §§ 51-54; Restatement [Second] of Contracts § 90). The Appellate Division has not, however, expressly decided whether a promissory estoppel cause of action can be based on promises made while the relevant question was a mandatory subject of collective bargaining. Here, we need not decide whether to recognize a promissory estoppel cause of action, either generally or in this particular context, because petitioners have failed to establish the existence of a clear and unambiguous promise.” “The SPDs themselves contain nothing that could be construed as a clear and unambiguous promise of Medicare supplemental insurance coverage for life. To the contrary, we agree with the City that the language in the SPDs is descriptive and for informational purposes only. The language on which petitioners rely—"becomes eligible," "is provided," "provides," and "supplements"—is in the present tense.” #nycourtofappeals #lawtalk #attorney #lawyer #laborlaw #healthcare #medicare