Why Japan Offered to Surrender Before Hiroshima — The One Condition America Accepted After Nagasaki скачать в хорошем качестве

Why Japan Offered to Surrender Before Hiroshima — The One Condition America Accepted After Nagasaki

July 12, 1945. Three weeks before Hiroshima. A cable left Tokyo marked with the highest classification the Japanese Foreign Ministry possessed. Addressed to Japanese Ambassador Naotake Sato in Moscow. Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo wrote: Japan wants to end the war. It has one condition. One. The Emperor. Hirohito must remain on the throne. The imperial institution must survive. Everything else—occupation, disarmament, territorial concessions, war crimes tribunals—Japan will accept. On the Emperor, it will not move. That cable was intercepted by American intelligence. Decoded. Read by Secretary of War Henry Stimson. Read by Secretary of State James Byrnes. Available to Harry Truman, who had been President for 91 days. Three weeks later—August 6, 1945—the Enola Gay dropped a uranium bomb on Hiroshima. Killed 70,000-80,000 people before lunch. August 9: Nagasaki. Another 40,000-70,000 dead. August 10: Japan offered to surrender. The condition: preserve the Emperor. August 14: America accepted. The Emperor remained. He remained before Hiroshima. He remained after Hiroshima. He remained after Nagasaki. He was still on the throne when he died in 1989.What changed between July 12 and August 15 was not the condition—the condition was constant. What changed was the intervening month, which contained two atomic bombs and 110,000-160,000 deaths in Hiroshima and Nagasaki alone. The July 12 MAGIC intercepts (decoded Japanese diplomatic cables) showed Togo instructing Sato to request Soviet mediation to end the war. Ambassador Sato responded bluntly: Japan was in no position to attach conditions, should accept unconditional surrender before the situation got worse. Togo's response: "The Emperor himself had commanded that the Foreign Ministry explore peace through Soviet mediation. That was not a matter for Sato's analysis. "Stimson had been arguing inside the Truman administration for weeks that this kind of signal would come and should be taken seriously. But Secretary of State Byrnes had different ideas—he wanted to demonstrate the bomb to the Soviets, establish postwar leverage. Henry Stimson's 1947 Harper's Magazine essay "The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb" claimed it saved 500,000 American lives. But actual invasion casualty projections available in July 1945 ranged from under 40,000 to somewhat over 100,000 American dead. The half million figure appears to have grown between summer 1945 and winter 1947.This is why the question won't go away: were the bombs necessary if the US was going to accept Japan's one condition anyway? SOURCES: National WWII Museum - "Pretty Little Phrases: Japanese Diplomacy in 1945" - Sato cables exposed "myth that Japan's leaders were near to ending war prior to Hiroshima," July 27 analysis: Japan nowhere near peace U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings - "The Surrender of Japan" (August 1955) - July 12, 1945 Togo instructed Sato inform Molotov Emperor wanted war ended, send Prince Konoye to Moscow Wikipedia - "Surrender of Japan" - June 22 Emperor summoned Big Six, Togo only one who realized Soviet entry coming, August 10 Japan offered conditional surrender Asia-Pacific Journal - "Atomic Bombs and Soviet Invasion" - Togo telegram 993 August 7 after Hiroshima still sought Moscow mediation, Soviet entry broke deadlock not atomic bomb National WWII Museum - "To Bear the Unbearable" - June 1945 Marquis Kido memo proposed Soviet mediation, zero chance US would accept Treaty of Versailles framework National Security Archive - "MAGIC Diplomatic Summary July 12, 1945" - Togo to Sato cable concerning Emperor's decision seek Soviet help, Gar Alperovitz argument: relaxing unconditional surrender sufficient