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1. Asatkhyāti – Apprehension of the Non-Existent The Asatkhyāti theory, upheld by Mādhyamika Śūnyavādins (Buddhist Nihilists) asserts that illusion is the cognition of what is absolutely non-existent (Asat). According to this view, both the object and its substratum are ultimately unreal (asat or śūnya). The illusion lies in apprehending something that has no real existence at all. Śaṅkara quotes this in the Bhāṣya: “anye tu yatra yad adhyāsas tasya viparīta dharmatva kalpanām ācakṣate” (“Others say that wherever superimposition occurs, it is the imagination of a contrary attribute in the substratum.”) In the classic śukti-rajata-bhrama (shell-silver illusion), the shell (śukti) itself is conventionally real (saṃvṛti satya), while the silver (rajata) is entirely unreal — an atyanta-asat-rūpa dharma, a quality of total non-existence. Thus, the illusion is the imagination of a completely unreal property (silver) upon a relatively real substratum (shell). The śukti (shell) has some empirical utility (artha-kriyākāritvam), but the rajata (illusory silver) lacks even that. The mind projects an absolutely unreal entity upon a conventionally real basis. 2. The Two Realities in Śūnyavāda Even though everything is ultimately asat (void), the Mādhyamikas maintain a practical distinction between: Saṃvṛti Satya (Conventional Truth) – the empirical, everyday world used for moral and ritual life, and Pāramārthika Satya (Ultimate Truth) – the absolute void (śūnya), where no object or self exists. Hence, while their ultimate metaphysics denies reality altogether, their ethical and ritual conduct operates within the pragmatic plane of saṃvṛti satya. 3. Advaita’s Reconciliation – Universal Basis of Adhyāsa After reviewing all competing theories (anyathākhyāti, ātmakhyāti, akhyāti, asatkhyāti), Śaṅkara concludes that every school accepts one common truth — the essential feature of adhyāsa: “Paratra parāvabhāsatvam” – the appearance of one thing in another. No philosophical system denies this core phenomenon (najahāti). All illusions, whatever their interpretation, involve the false appearance of something where it is not. 4. Advaita’s Unique Contribution – Mithyātva of the Superimposed Object Advaita Vedānta defines the superimposed object (e.g., the silver) as Mithyā – neither real (sat) nor unreal (asat), but anirvacanīya (indescribable). Reasoning: It is directly perceived (aparokṣa) on the substratum (the shell). It cannot be real, since it is sublated (bādhita) when the truth is known. It cannot be non-existent (asat), since it was experienced. Hence, it is Mithyā – empirically evident yet ultimately false. The falsity of the superimposed object (āropya-mithyātva) requires no complex logic (na yuktyapekṣā) because it is established by everyday experience: the illusion vanishes upon right knowledge. 5. Two Major Kinds of Adhyāsa According to Śaṅkara A. Nirupādhika Adhyāsa (Unconditioned Superimposition) Nature: Immediate, uncaused error. Example: “Śuktikā hi rajatavad avabhāsate” – “The shell appears as silver.” Application: Used as an analogy for the superimposition of the ego (ahaṅkāra) upon the Ātman. Role of Avidyā: It acts as the Nimitta (efficient cause) but not as an Upādhi (limiting adjunct). B. Sopādhika Adhyāsa (Conditioned Superimposition) Nature: Error conditioned by a limiting adjunct (Upādhi). Example: “Ekaś candraḥ sa-dvitīyavat” – “One moon appears as two” (caused by pressing one’s eyeball). Application: Illustrates the superimposition of the difference between Brahman and Jīva, conditioned by Avidyā as Upādhi. Mechanism: The Upādhi (e.g., sense defect or individuality) makes the one reality appear dual (dvidhā bhāti). 6. Conclusion – Lakṣaṇa-Prakaraṇa Upasaṁhāraḥ The section concludes with the phrase “lakṣaṇa-prakaraṇa upasaṁhāraḥ iti śabdaḥ” — marking the end of Śaṅkara’s discussion on the definition of Adhyāsa. In essence, Śaṅkara’s final standpoint integrates the truths partially captured by other schools: Unlike Asatkhyāti, Advaita does not call illusion sheer non-existence. Unlike Anyathākhyāti, it does not assert real misplacement. Unlike Akhyāti, it does not reduce it to non-discrimination. Instead, Advaita affirms that the superimposed object is Mithyā — experientially real yet ultimately false — arising through Avidyā as the universal mechanism of appearance.