INTERPRETATION OF DEEDS STATUTES - INTERNAL AID - NON-OPERATIVE AND OPERATIVE- DOCUMENTS ( Part 2) скачать в хорошем качестве

INTERPRETATION OF DEEDS STATUTES - INTERNAL AID - NON-OPERATIVE AND OPERATIVE- DOCUMENTS ( Part 2)

AIDS TO INTERPRETATION — INTERNAL AID - NON-OPERATIVE AND OPERATIVE- DOCUMENTS ( Part 2) This lecture opens the “Aids to Interpretation” thematic block within the Modern Purposive Approach (MOPA). The central premise is simple but decisive: meaning is not inherent in legal texts; it is produced through disciplined interpretation. As Adjei puts it, “No text is clear, simple or complex until the interpreter attempts to interpret it with all the tools available to him or her.” Under MOPA, “clarity” is not the absence of interpretation; it is the outcome of interpretation. WHAT ARE “AIDS TO INTERPRETATION”? Aids are legitimate tools, materials, and reasoning principles a court may employ to ascertain meaning, scope, and legal effect where doubt, ambiguity, obscurity, or apparent inconsistency arises. They are guides, not binding rules, and they operate cumulatively: • Internal aids (within the text) • External aids (outside the text) • Linguistic canons • Presumptions • Special binding rules (where applicable) READ THE TEXT AS A WHOLE — NO ATOMISM MOPA rejects the habit of construing a single word as if it were self-sufficient. Context can show that a word is redundant, superfluous, or a drafting error. Ghana’s Supreme Court exemplified this approach in Republic v High Court, Accra; Ex parte Allgate Co Ltd (SC), where a rigid reading would have defeated the purpose of the Rules and stultified justice under C.I. 47. The interpretive duty is to preserve coherence, not to idolise isolated words. TEXT AS AN INTEGRATED WHOLE (BARAK) Adjei adopts Aharon Barak’s insight that a legal text is “a unified text that must be interpreted as a whole”, not a loose federation of provisions. The interpreter may, where justified by purpose and coherence, read down language, treat words as surplusage, or correct obvious slips—without rewriting the instrument. “SHALL” AND “MAY” — WARNING AGAINST MECHANICAL READINGS A frequent error is equating “shall” with mandatory and “may” with discretionary, regardless of context. Adjei warns that it is “suicidal” to interpret these words mechanically. The Supreme Court’s approach in Republic v High Court, Koforidua; Ex parte Ansah-Otu (SC) illustrates why: “shall” may be construed as directory where justice and the scheme of the Rules demand it. FORMALISM AS A CAUTIONARY TALE: RE AKOTO Re Akoto and 7 Others [1961] GLR 523 remains a cautionary constitutional moment: narrow verbalism (“shall” versus “should”) produced a restrictive view of enforceable rights. Under MOPA, interpretive choices must be tested against structure, purpose, and constitutional values. COMPARATIVE SUPPORT: THE “LIVING” CONSTITUTION Ghana’s purposive direction resonates with common-law constitutionalism elsewhere. In Theophanous v Herald & Weekly Times Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 104, the High Court of Australia emphasised constitutional construction as dynamic, resisting “dead hands” reasoning that freezes meaning in time. ACT 792 AND PURPOSE BEYOND STATUTES Although the Interpretation Act, 2009 (Act 792) formally governs enactments and instruments made under enactments, its purposive philosophy helps illuminate interpretation across written instruments (deeds, contracts, wills), especially where “instrument” is broadly conceived and the court is pursuing coherence, reason, and justice. AIDS ARE SERVANTS, NOT MASTERS The controlling ethic is captured by Lord Reid: rules of construction are “our servants not our masters” (*Maunsell v Olins* [1975] 1 All ER 16). If a purported “aid” obscures meaning or defeats purpose, it must be discarded. ROADMAP OF THE BLOCK (LECTURES 2–5) • Lecture 2: Internal aids — non-operative parts (dates, parties, recitals, headings, marginal notes, jurats, punctuation), including the purposive approach to jurats under Cap 262 and Duodu v Adomako [2012] 1 SCGLR 198. • Lecture 3: Internal aids — operative parts (parcels, habendum, schedules, provisos, definitions), including P Y Atta & Sons Ltd v Kingsman Enterprise Ltd [2009] SCGLR 265 and schedules as integral text (*Kuenyehia v Archer* [1993–94] 2 GLR 525). • #LawOfInterpretation #GhanaLaw #Act792 #LegalMethod #StatutoryInterpretation #DeedsAndContracts #PurposiveApproach